Online Appendix to "Who is to Blame? Youth Crime and Attribution of Responsibility in Urban Mexico"

April 5, 2023

Contents

1 Survey Protocols

Our survey was fielded in partnership with our local partner, **[INSERT NAME]**, based in Mexico City, Mexico. The survey was fielded as part of the larger Performance Evaluation of USAID/Mexico's Crime and Violence Prevention Activity.

1.1 Survey Format and Recruitment

The survey was conducted face-to-face with structured questionnaires by trained interviews who used personal tablets. Interviewers followed all local COVID-19 protocols and maintained social distance from interviewees. Once a survey was complete, responses were immediately uploaded to the cloud and removed from the tablet to ensure sensitive information would not be at risk of disclosure. All completed questionnaires were checked during and after fieldwork for quality control. Interviewers also worked in teams of three with a supervisor whose responsibility was to monitor quality and make any necessary adjustments.

To recruit survey participants, enumerators follow a random selection process detailed in the following section. Once participants are selected, the enumerator invites a participant in the household to participate in the survey completely voluntarily. Subjects were told they could decline to participate or end their participation in the survey at any time. Enumerators required verbal consent to participate from the respondents following a consent text. Consent was not requested from parents, as we did not interview youths under the age of 16. Participants may have responded differently (and bias results) during interviews if they knew their parents needed to consent. Further, some answers regarding behavior among youth, such as entertainment and attitudes towards crime in the community, were likely to be influenced by parental approval.

We did not offer compensation for participation in the survey, which is standard among short in-person surveys in the region (e.g., the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University). Surveys took on average about 20 minutes of respondents' time. Although respondents were not offered monetary compensation, they were told of the possible benefits of participation. These included voicing concerns regarding violence in their communities and how the results from our study could help develop a deeper understanding regarding insecurity dynamics in the localities where the surveyed individuals live. The project was also conducted in conjunction with USAID, and was aimed to better design crime prevention efforts in Mexico, which would positively impact research subjects.

No methods of deception were included in our survey, nor was identifiable information collected regarding any of the participants. The research involved no more than minimal risk to subjects, the investigators and research staff apart from possible discomfort when responding to some questions. However, participants were warned of this risk and the consent process emphasized the option for respondents to end the survey at any time if they wished.

1.2 Sampling Design

The survey was designed to achieve a nationally representative sample of urban Mexico for ages 16-29. In addition, the survey was designed to be representative of certain security realities (homicide, perceived insecurity, and victimization). To do so, a multistage area probability sampling design was used. Respondents were selected using a four stage sampling process. Stage 1 involved the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs), which in this case were electoral sections - a small geographic jurisdiction

in Mexico that is smaller than the municipality. They constitute the basic territorial unit of single-member electoral districts for citizens to register to vote. As of March 2021, Mexico was divided into be very 68,806 electoral sections.

To select PSUs, the sampling frame was limited to Mexican municipalities which were covered by the Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Pública Urbana (ENSU, National Urban Public Security Survey) run by Mexico's national statistical institute, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografia (INEGI). This survey is representative of urban Mexico and includes important public security information that was used later in the sampling process. From this, the number of PSUs eligible to be included in our survey was reduced to 30,878. We supplemented this list of municipalities and PSUs with additional information from the November 2020 Geoelectoral Information Catalog from INEGI and the 2020 Census to create our final sampling frame.

We supplemented the sampling frame with additional information regarding three measures of security realities in Mexico. We added three municipal-level measures of violence. These were homicide rates as reported by the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security (SESNSP), a measure of perceived community security, and a measure of victimization. In Mexico, homicide data are available from two sources - via the SESNSP reflecting police investigations, and via INEGI from death certificates. Although INEGI data tends to be more precise, the publication of this data is usually delayed by over a year. Because of this, we use SESNSP data which covered the entirety of 2020 at the municipal level. We only use data regarding intentional homicides.

The latter two measures were generated using responses from the ENSU survey. Given that the ENSU data are not representative at the municipal level, we generated municipal estimates using multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP). To do so, we brought in additioanl infromation from the 2015 intercensus. These measures capture the preponderance of nonhomicidal crime (victimization) and perceived community insecurity at the municipal level. In particular, we used the following questions from the ENSU survey:

- **Perceived Security**: In terms of crime, do you consider that to live in (CITY) currently is … [safe, unsafe]? *En términos de la delincuencia, ¿considera que vivir actualmente en (CIUDAD), es … [seguro, inseguro]?*

- **Victimization**:During the past year [insert year], that is to say from January to today, has a member of your household (including yourself) been victim of (INSERT TYPE OF CRIME) on card A? *Durante este año [insert year], es decir, de enero a la fecha, ¿algún integrante de este hogar incluido usted, sufrieron la situación (CÓDIGO DE INCIDENCIA) de la tarjeta A?*

  - Robbery or assault in the street or in public transportation? Yes or No. *Robo o asalto en la calle o en el transporte público (incluye robo en banco o cajero automático)? Sí o No?*
  - Threats, pressure, or deception to demand money or goods or to do something/not to do something (extortion, blackmail)? Yes or No? *Amenazas, presiones, o engaños para exigir dinero o bienes; o para que hiciera algo o dejara de hacerlo (extorsión)? Sí o No?*

For the first measure, perceived security, we coded the variable as 1 if an individual reported feeling "insecure" and 0 if an individual reported feeling "secure" in their city. For our second measure, victimization, we coded the variable as 1 if the individual reported that a member of their household had either experienced robbery or extortion in the past year and coded 0 if not.

With these questions, we then estimated the relationship between various individual-level characteristics and their responses on these selected survey questions. We did this through multilevel regression, where we determined the relationship between selected characteristics—in this case age, gender, education, and occupation—and reported (i) insecurity and (ii) household victimization. This involved two separate regression models, one for each outcome variable. The regression also factored in geographic location, with individuals' municipalities (unrepresentative unit of interest) nested within their states (geographic unit of the survey).

Once these regression estimates were calculated, we then post-stratified them. This involved weighting our estimates by the prevalence of each type of individual within each municipality based on their individual-level characteristics (i.e., age, education, etc.). This "prevalence" was calculated by determining the population of each type of individual within a municipality according to the 2015 intercensus. The regression estimates, weighted in this manner, generated a municipal-level estimate (one for each municipality) for the most likely response to each of the two survey questions.

Through this process, we calculated two municipal-level estimates: one quantifying nonhomicidal victimization and the other quantifying residents' perception of community security in their municipality. We calculated these values for all municipalities included in the most recent ENSU survey, yielding estimates for 157 municipalities. These values can be interpreted as a ranking of perceived security and victimization among the municipalities we examined. They allowed us to determine within our sample of municipalities how they rank comparatively in terms of these two values. However, these measures do have error associated with them and cannot be compared to estimates outside of these analyses. This error was predominantly created by limitations due to question wording and the need to match variables between the census and survey. We had to match individual-level responses on the ENSU survey to biographical information about the head of household, as certain attributes were only recorded at the head-of-household level (e.g., education level, occupation) in this survey. We used these head-of-household characteristics when considering the prevalence of each type of individual in the intercensus. Thus, these measures are not perfect individual-level measures, but did provide us with comparable intersample estimates. For this reason, we interpreted them as a ranking. For more information regarding the MRP indicators, see Appendix 1.2.

These measures were then added to our sampling frame for their corresponding municipalities and PSUs. Our sample of PSUs were then selected for the sample through a systematic method of stratified probability proportional to size (PPS). Each PSU in the sampling frame was also assigned a nonoverlapping sample stratum based on the three security variables. We combined PPS with a systematic sampling approach and used implicit stratification (via a travelling salesperson algorithm) based on the three violence measures. Survey sample strate information can be seen in Table 1. In total, 288 PSUs were selected and 10 interviews was conducted in each PSU.

Within each strata available, electoral precincts, our primarily sampling unit (PSU) were chosen based on the probability proportional to each precinct's size (PPS). In all, 288 electoral sections were selected from the sampling frame and 10 interviews were conducted in each.

In some cases, PSUs were not available to conduct interviews due to various circumstances, including security concerns for interviewers. In such cases, a new PSU with the same stratum characteristics and probability of selection was drawn from an independent sample.

With this sample of PSUs, area segments sampling was then used to select second-stage sampling units (SSUs). We used blocks as our SSUs, or geographic spaces delimited by streets or avenues. SSUs were identified and assigned to interviews using maps from the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE, Na-

tional Electoral Institute). Within each PSU, two SSus were selected via a random sample from INE's Catálogo de Manzanas (a catalog of small geographic subdivisions called "manzanas").

Table 1: Strata Information for Sample Frame and Sample

Strata	F Mun #	F Mun Prop.	F Pop.	F Pop. Prop.	S Mun #	S Mun Prop.	S Pop.	S Pop. Prop.
High -Low-Low	1	0.006	18812	0.000	1.000	0.009	768.000	0.001
High -High-High	12	0.076	3624341	0.080	9.400	0.087	77308.600	0.086
High -High-Low	28	0.178	11204188	0.246	24.200	0.225	228749.000	0.257
Med -Low -Low	10	0.064	1641492	0.036	5.000	0.046	39381.600	0.044
Med -High-High	19	0.121	8489648	0.187	15.200	0.141	126626.200	0.142
Med -High-Low	11	0.070	5328138	0.117	7.400	0.069	108716.000	0.122
Low -Low-High	1	0.006	231209	0.005	1.000	0.009	5381.600	0.006
Low -Low-Low	46	0.293	8313862	0.183	28.200	0.262	181206.000	0.203
Low -High-High	15	0.096	3192100	0.070	8.400	0.078	50260.000	0.057
Low -High-Low	14	0.089	3418396	0.075	8.600	0.080	73078.400	0.082

Note: "F" and "S" indicate "Frame" and "Sample," respectively. Strata listed in terms homicide rate, perceived insecurity, and reported victimization.

Once the SSUs were selected, housing units were then chosen which represented our final sampling unit. Five interviews were conducted per SSU. Housing units were selected via a spiral method and clockwise walking. Interviewers cover each block by starting at the northeast corner and use a sampling interval of 3 housing units. Once an interview is completed, the interviewer moves to the other side of the block, ensuring that only one interview is conducted on each side of the block. Then, interviewers moved to an adjacent block using the spiral method. In multi-story buildings, the same process was utilized but only when a building occupies a whole block. If a building is located on one side of the block, only one interview may take place inside the building. After such an interview, interviewers must move on from both the building and side of the block.

Once housing units were selected, an individual is then selected by the interviewer. A short screening interview was conducted with a knowledgeable adult to determine if members of the household meet the study eligibility criteria. With the information provided by the present adult, the tablet then picks a respondent from the total pool of eligible household inhabitants. The interviewer then asks to speak to that individual.

In total, 64 interviewers were used to complete the survey. 2,880 interviews were completed over nine days between June 12 and June 20, 2021.

2 MRP Goodness of Fit Indicators

In this section, we demonstrate information which confirms the adequacy of our MRP indicators. First, we demonstrate the correlations between our two MRP measures and the true values (means) of the variables we used to create these measures (victimization and perceived security). High, but not perfect, correlation would indicate a strong MRP estimate. This is shown in Figure 1, which confirms that our MRP estimates and the true values are highly correlated (for those municipalities for which we had a representative estimator). We also see a correlation between homicide rates and MRP insecurity perception estimates, but a nearly zero correlation between homicide rates and MRP victimization estimates. We observe a high correlation between MRP security and victimization estimates.

To further explore these results, we ran mixed-effects models with random intercepts by state. Results are shown in Figure 2, on which population, homicide, and homicide rate are re-scaled as values ranging from 0 to 1.



Figure 1: Correlations between MRP Estimates and True Values (Means)

	Security 2020			Vic. 2020		
Predictors	*Estimates*	*CI*	*p*	*Estimates*	*CI*	*p*
Intercept	5.88	-20.14 – 31.90	0.658	5.62	-1.32 – 12.57	0.113
Log Population	4.03	2.00 – 6.06	**<0.001**	0.69	0.17 – 1.22	**0.010**
Hom. Total	6.32	-20.92 – 33.56	0.649	1.40	-5.85 – 8.65	0.705
Hom. Per 100k	28.13	7.67 – 48.59	**0.007**	1.44	-4.09 – 6.97	0.610
Random Effects						
σ^2	106.15			6.74		
τ_{00}	181.22 $_{state\_code}$			31.08 $_{state\_code}$		
ICC	0.63			0.82		
N	32 $_{state\_code}$			32 $_{state\_code}$		
Observations	157			157		
Marginal R^2 / Conditional R^2	0.208 / 0.708			0.036 / 0.828		

Figure 2: Correlations between MRP Estimates and True Values (Means)

For the security measures on Table 1, as the population increases, so does insecurity. As the homicide rate increases, so does the insecurity index. Total homicide does not have a significant relationship with this index. In terms of the victimization index, there is little relationship with the included variables (the coefficient sizes are very small and confidence intervals cross zero). As population increases, the victimization index increases slightly. However, total homicide and homicide rate do not have significant relationships with victimization index, as confidence intervals include zero in both cases. From this analysis, we observe that in urban Mexico, there are places with homicide violence but not much other violence and vice versa, and there does seem to be little correlation between homicide rates and victimization estimates. There are correlations between homicide rates and security perceptions, although these are not high. Therefore, we divided the sampling units (using the ENSU sample) by levels of homicide, nonhomicidal violence (victimization), and insecurity perception.

Below, Figure 3 provides ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curves for the multi-level models used in the MRP process. This curve demonstrates the ability of the models to correctly predict outcomes, with the x-y line indicating a "null model." It can be considered a measure of sensitivity (probability of detection) versus specificity (probability of false detection) and is essentially a plot of the model's power as a function of Type 1 error (rejection of true null hypothesis, false positive). Both plots below indicate the models perform better than the null model, providing evidence of their strength for prediction of both outcomes of interest (victimization and perceived security).



Figure 3: Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves for Multilevel Models

3 Survey Descriptive Statistics

Table 2: Outcome Variables

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Internal Blame	5.31	1.56	1	7
External Blame	4.65	1.51	1	7
Relative Blame	0.55	0.16	0	1

Table 3: Sex, Age, and Education Breakdown

Sex	Mean Age	Mode Edu	Num. Respondents
Male	21.47	Preparatoria o bachillerato	1326
Female	22.38	Preparatoria o bachillerato	1554

Table 4: Employment Status in the Past Week

Type	% Respondents
Worked	43.5
Had a job but did not work	1.8
Looked for work	5.5
Student	25.8
Household work	15.6
Permanently Incapacitated	0.7
Did not work	6.3
No response	1.0

Table 5: Economic Indicators

	Marginalization	SES
Minimum	-2.23	0.00
Mean	-1.59	1.94
Maximum	-0.20	2.56

4 Experimental Attributes Randomization Statistics and Balance Tests

This section demonstrates successful randomization and balance of the experimental portion of the survey. Tables 6-9 demonstrate the percentage of respondent who viewed each attribute for each rotation of the experiment. Across all rotations, the percentage of respondents to view each attribute are comparable. Figures 4-7 demonstrate the balance across various respondent-level characteristics in terms of the attributes viewed for each rotation. We examine balance across respondent-level SES, vote for the PRI in the last election, gender, education, and age. Across all rotations, balance is achieved for all characteristics examined/

Table 6: Rotation 1: Perpetrator SES

Attribute	% Respondents
Lower class family	50.5
Middle class family	49.5

Table 7: Rotation 2: Crime Severity

Attribute	% Respondents
Assassinate	24.5
Extort	26.3
Rob Cellphone	26.1
Kidnap	23.1

Table 8: Rotation 3: Victim

Attribute	% Respondents
Businessman	33.3
Worker	32.7
Local Politician	33.9

Table 9: Rotation 4: Perpetrator Role

Attribute	% Respondents
Following Orders	48.4
Gang Leader	51.6



Figure 4: Balance Tests for Perpetrator Socioeconomic Status



Figure 5: Balance Tests for Crime Type



Figure 6: Balance Tests for Type of Victim



Figure 7: Balance Tests for Perpetrator Position

Table 10: Items Included in Socioeconomic Status Variable and Descriptive Statistics

Please tell me if you or a member of your household has CURRENT access to each of the following services in your home (Yes = 1, No = 0):	**Minimum**	**Median**	**Mean**	**Max**	**NA's**
Car	0	1	0.58	1	21
Clothes Washer	0	1	0.88	1	22
Indoor Plumbing	0	1	0.94	1	24
Computer	0	1	0.64	1	23
Internet	0	1	0.87	1	26
Cell Phone	0	1	0.94	1	22
Domestic Worker	0	0	0.26	1	27

5 Socioeconomic Status Variable Creation

To create the variable which we use to measure socioeconomic status (SES), we rely on a battery of questions regarding the possession of certain material goods (see Table 10). We then use these questions to create one variable measuring SES using principal component analysis (PCA). We use the first calculated component which explains the most variance (over 30 %) across participants (see Figure 8). Not all participants responded to each question regarding possession of each good – to fill in these gaps, we used multiple imputation using predictive mean matching (PMM) (see Heitjan and Little (1991); Little (1988)), implemented via the Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) package in R (Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). This process resulted in a variable which has a maximum value of 2.56, minimum value of 0, and mean value of 1.94.



Figure 8: PCA Variance Explained

6 Main Results with Trust in Police Controls

The following models present our pooled results with controls for trust in the police (municipal, state, and federal). With regard to internal blame, or blame for the perpetrator, trust in the police is not a significant predictor of blame. However, with respect to external blame – or blame for the government and society – we see that as trust in municipal and state police increase, respondents blame external actors more. This could be due to the fact that respondents feel that these external actors should be capable of dealing with these issues, are have not. Or, they may feel betrayed by these trusted actors. Interestingly, results are also significant when examining relative blame, but only for state and federal police. The negative sign of these coefficients indicate that increased trust in the state and federal police corresponds to more relative blame based on the perpetrator vs. state actors.

Table 11: Internal Blame: Pooled Results

	Dependent variable:		
Class: Middle	0.213***	0.210***	0.216***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Crime Severity	0.023	0.025	0.020
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Victim: Worker	0.068	0.067	0.064
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Local Politician	−0.040	−0.041	−0.043
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.392***	0.386***	0.389***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Trust: Mun.Police	−0.001		
	(0.017)		
Trust: State Police		−0.004	
		(0.018)	
Trust: Fed Police			−0.027
			(0.017)
Constant	4.937***	4.951***	5.073***
	(0.109)	(0.115)	(0.127)
Observations	2,855	2,856	2,854
R^2	0.022	0.021	0.022
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.019	0.020
Residual Std. Error	1.549 (df = 2848)	1.547 (df = 2849)	1.549 (df = 2847)
F Statistic	10.497*** (df = 6; 2848)	10.275*** (df = 6; 2849)	10.918*** (df = 6; 2847)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: External Blame: Pooled Results

	Dependent variable:		
Class: Middle	−0.040	−0.033	−0.041
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Crime Severity	0.021	0.020	0.021
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Victim: Worker	−0.043	−0.036	−0.038
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Local Politician	0.092	0.104	0.099
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	−0.261***	−0.254***	−0.259***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Trust: Mun.Police	0.036**		
	(0.017)		
Trust: State Police		0.039**	
		(0.017)	
Trust: Fed Police			0.020
			(0.017)
Constant	4.611***	4.576***	4.633***
	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.123)
Observations	2,852	2,852	2,852
R^2	0.011	0.011	0.010
Adjusted R^2	0.009	0.009	0.008
Residual Std. Error (df = 2845)	1.504	1.504	1.505
F Statistic (df = 6; 2845)	5.167***	5.166***	4.690***
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: Relative Blame: Pooled Results

	Dependent variable:		
Class: Middle	0.021***	0.020***	0.022***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Crime Severity	0.0004	0.001	0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Victim: Worker	0.010	0.009	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Local Politician	−0.010	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.054***	0.053***	0.053***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Trust: Mun.Police	−0.003		
	(0.002)		
Trust: State Police		−0.004*	
		(0.002)	
Trust: Fed Police			−0.004*
			(0.002)
Constant	0.525***	0.530***	0.534***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Observations	2,841	2,842	2,842
R^2	0.027	0.027	0.027
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.025	0.025
Residual Std. Error	0.184 (df = 2834)	0.184 (df = 2835)	0.184 (df = 2835)
F Statistic	12.953*** (df = 6; 2834)	12.911*** (df = 6; 2835)	13.317*** (df = 6; 2835)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

7 Main Results with Corruption Controls

In addition to exploring the possible effects of reported trust in the police, we also explore the degree to which levels of police and government corruption may influence our results. Unfortunately, we do not have an individual-level variable capturing experiences with corruptions, and a municipal-level variable does not exist. However, at the state level we have two variables we can use. In particular, we draw from Mexico's National Institute for Statistics and Geography's (INEGI) 2021 National Survey of Quality and Impact (Encuesta Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental, ENCIG). From this survey, we can calculate a state-level measure for police corruption and government corruption. Our police corruption variable captures the percentage of the adult population in a state who experienced acts of corruption in their interactions with local and federal bureaucracies during 2021. Our government corruption variable captures the percentage of the adult population who experienced acts of corruption in their interactions with public security authorities. ENCIG is representative at the state level for citizens who live in cities with more than 100 thousand residents. This is ideal, as our survey sample is similarly only representative of the urban population.

These models show that the state-level average of corruption experience with both police and the general government are not significant predictors of internal, external, or relative blame attribution. Furthermore, results remain consistent with models presented in the main text.

Table 14: Internal Blame: Pooled Results

	Dependent variable:	
Class: Middle	0.215^{***}	0.214^{***}
	(0.058)	(0.058)
Crime Severity	0.024	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Victim: Worker	0.068	0.067
	(0.071)	(0.071)
Local Politician	−0.041	−0.040
	(0.071)	(0.071)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.389^{***}	0.390^{***}
	(0.058)	(0.058)
Corruption: Police	0.0003	
	(0.003)	
Corruption: Government		−0.003
		(0.004)
Constant	4.915^{***}	5.018^{***}
	(0.201)	(0.130)
Observations	2,864	2,864
R^2	0.022	0.022
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.020
Residual Std. Error (df = 2857)	1.549	1.548
F Statistic (df = 6; 2857)	10.484^{***}	10.615^{***}
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 15: External Blame: Pooled Results

	Dependent variable:	
Class: Middle	−0.041	−0.041
	(0.056)	(0.056)
Crime Severity	0.018	0.019
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Victim: Worker	−0.042	−0.041
	(0.069)	(0.069)
Local Politician	0.100	0.101
	(0.069)	(0.069)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	−0.257***	−0.257***
	(0.056)	(0.056)
Corruption: Police	−0.004	
	(0.003)	
Corruption: Government		−0.002
		(0.004)
Constant	5.015***	4.773***
	(0.196)	(0.127)
Observations	2,860	2,860
R^2	0.010	0.009
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.007
Residual Std. Error (df = 2853)	1.504	1.505
F Statistic (df = 6; 2853)	4.803***	4.401***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 16: Relative Blame: Pooled Results

	Dependent variable:	
Class: Middle	0.021***	0.021***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Crime Severity	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Victim: Worker	0.010	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Local Politician	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.053***	0.053***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Corruption: Police	0.0004	
	(0.0003)	
Corruption: Government		−0.0001
		(0.0004)
Constant	0.489***	0.518***
	(0.024)	(0.016)
Observations	2,849	2,849
R^2	0.026	0.026
Adjusted R^2	0.024	0.024
Residual Std. Error (df = 2842)	0.184	0.184
F Statistic (df = 6; 2842)	12.886***	12.628***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

8 Main Results with Categorical Crime Variable

In the main results, we operationalize crime severity as a continuous variable. In this section, we present the main results using a categorical crime variable instead of the continuous version. As reported in Tables 17–22, the key findings remain virtually identical.

Table 17: Internal Blame: Pooled Results

	Dependent variable:		
Class: Middle	0.213***	0.219***	0.222***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Crime: Assassinate	0.060	0.056	0.059
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Extort	0.042	0.033	0.039
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Kidnap	0.102	0.092	0.103
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.082)
Victim: Worker	0.069	0.067	0.058
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Local Politician	−0.042	−0.045	−0.051
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.388***	0.385***	0.387***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Marginalization		−0.394***	
		(0.100)	
SES			0.314***
			(0.052)
Constant	4.947***	4.327***	4.340***
	(0.081)	(0.177)	(0.129)
Observations	2,864	2,864	2,864
R^2	0.022	0.027	0.034
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.024	0.032
Residual Std. Error	1.549 (df = 2856)	1.545 (df = 2855)	1.539 (df = 2855)
F Statistic	9.085*** (df = 7; 2856)	9.942*** (df = 8; 2855)	12.644*** (df = 8; 2855)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: Internal Blame: Divided by Community Homicide Level

	Dependent variable:					
	High Homicide	Low Homicide	High Homicide	Low Homicide	High Homicide	Low Homicide
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class: Middle	0.300***	0.129*	0.299***	0.138*	0.321***	0.130*
	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.078)
Crime: Assassinate	−0.202*	0.330***	−0.202*	0.324***	−0.200*	0.327***
	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.112)
Extort	−0.068	0.154	−0.070	0.143	−0.072	0.153
	(0.118)	(0.108)	(0.117)	(0.108)	(0.117)	(0.108)
Kidnap	−0.247**	0.430***	−0.258**	0.423***	−0.243**	0.431***
	(0.123)	(0.111)	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.122)	(0.111)
Victim: Worker	0.121	0.029	0.112	0.031	0.091	0.031
	(0.104)	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.096)
Local Politician	−0.014	−0.063	−0.013	−0.067	−0.039	−0.060
	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.103)	(0.096)	(0.103)	(0.095)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.438***	0.327***	0.444***	0.321***	0.439***	0.326***
	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.079)
Marginalization			−0.514***	−0.268*		
			(0.142)	(0.142)		
SES					0.382***	0.245***
					(0.074)	(0.072)
Constant	5.029***	4.866***	4.234***	4.436***	4.307***	4.381***
	(0.120)	(0.109)	(0.250)	(0.252)	(0.184)	(0.179)
Observations	1,410	1,454	1,410	1,454	1,410	1,454
R^2	0.031	0.028	0.040	0.031	0.049	0.036
Adjusted R^2	0.026	0.024	0.035	0.025	0.044	0.031
Residual Std. Error	1.595 (df = 1402)	1.494 (df = 1446)	1.588 (df = 1401)	1.493 (df = 1445)	1.581 (df = 1401)	1.489 (df = 1445)
F Statistic	6.425*** (df = 7; 1402)	6.035*** (df = 7; 1446)	7.302*** (df = 8; 1401)	5.738*** (df = 8; 1445)	9.021*** (df = 8; 1401)	6.762*** (df = 8; 1445)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: Blame for External Actors (Pooled Results)

	Dependent variable:		
Class: Middle	−0.039	−0.040	−0.045
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Crime: Assassinate	0.068	0.069	0.069
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Extort	0.034	0.036	0.036
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Kidnap	0.015	0.016	0.014
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.080)
Victim: Worker	−0.041	−0.041	−0.034
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Local Politician	0.100	0.100	0.106
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	−0.256***	−0.255***	−0.255***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Marginalization		0.054	
		(0.097)	
SES			−0.202***
			(0.051)
Constant	4.751***	4.836***	5.140***
	(0.079)	(0.172)	(0.125)
Observations	2,860	2,860	2,860
R^2	0.009	0.009	0.015
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.007	0.012
Residual Std. Error	1.505 (df = 2852)	1.505 (df = 2851)	1.501 (df = 2851)
F Statistic	3.784*** (df = 7; 2852)	3.349*** (df = 8; 2851)	5.317*** (df = 8; 2851)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 20: Blame for External Actors (Divided by Community Homicide Level)

	Dependent variable:					
	High Homicide	Low Homicide	High Homicide	Low Homicide	High Homicide	Low Homicide
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class: Middle	−0.188**	0.102	−0.187**	0.105	−0.198**	0.102
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Crime: Assassinate	−0.092	0.222*	−0.093	0.220*	−0.094	0.226**
	(0.109)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.114)
Extort	−0.008	0.068	−0.007	0.065	−0.006	0.069
	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.110)
Kidnap	−0.124	0.144	−0.121	0.141	−0.126	0.144
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.113)
Victim: Worker	−0.036	−0.044	−0.033	−0.043	−0.020	−0.045
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.099)
Local Politician	0.057	0.141	0.056	0.140	0.070	0.139
	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.098)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	−0.287***	−0.235***	−0.288***	−0.237***	−0.286***	−0.234***
	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Marginalization			0.148	−0.080		
			(0.132)	(0.144)		
SES					−0.198***	−0.209***
					(0.069)	(0.074)
Constant	4.966***	4.552***	5.195***	4.424***	5.339***	4.965***
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.233)	(0.256)	(0.172)	(0.183)
Observations	1,403	1,457	1,403	1,457	1,403	1,457
R^2	0.015	0.012	0.016	0.012	0.021	0.017
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.007	0.011	0.007	0.016	0.012
Residual Std. Error	1.474 (df = 1395)	1.531 (df = 1449)	1.474 (df = 1394)	1.531 (df = 1448)	1.471 (df = 1394)	1.527 (df = 1448)
F Statistic	3.122*** (df = 7; 1395)	2.499** (df = 7; 1449)	2.889*** (df = 8; 1394)	2.224** (df = 8; 1448)	3.761*** (df = 8; 1394)	3.203*** (df = 8; 1448)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 21: Internal vs. External Blame (Pooled Results)

	Dependent variable:		
Class: Middle	0.021***	0.022***	0.022***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Crime: Assassinate	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Extort	−0.001	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Kidnap	0.007	0.006	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Victim: Worker	0.010	0.010	0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Local Politician	−0.011	−0.011	−0.012
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Marginalization		−0.038***	
		(0.012)	
SES			0.044***
			(0.006)
Constant	0.516***	0.457***	0.432***
	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.015)
Observations	2,849	2,849	2,849
R^2	0.026	0.030	0.043
Adjusted R^2	0.024	0.027	0.041
Residual Std. Error	0.184 (df = 2841)	0.184 (df = 2840)	0.182 (df = 2840)
F Statistic	10.945*** (df = 7; 2841)	10.884*** (df = 8; 2840)	16.028*** (df = 8; 2840)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 22: Internal vs. External Blame (Divided by Community Homicide Level)

	Dependent variable:					
	High Homicide	Low Homicide	High Homicide	Low Homicide	High Homicide	Low Homicide
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class: Middle	0.040***	0.003	0.040***	0.004	0.043***	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Crime: Assassinate	−0.010	0.009	−0.009	0.009	−0.009	0.009
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Extort	−0.006	0.005	−0.006	0.004	−0.006	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Kidnap	−0.011	0.024*	−0.012	0.024*	−0.010	0.024*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Victim: Worker	0.014	0.007	0.013	0.007	0.010	0.007
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Local Politician	−0.006	−0.016	−0.006	−0.016	−0.009	−0.015
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.059***	0.046***	0.060***	0.046***	0.059***	0.046***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Marginalization			−0.056***	−0.016		
			(0.016)	(0.018)		
SES					0.049***	0.039***
					(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	0.506***	0.525***	0.420***	0.499***	0.414***	0.448***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Observations	1,397	1,452	1,397	1,452	1,397	1,452
R^2	0.039	0.021	0.047	0.022	0.061	0.034
Adjusted R^2	0.034	0.017	0.042	0.017	0.055	0.029
Residual Std. Error	0.183 (df = 1389)	0.185 (df = 1444)	0.182 (df = 1388)	0.185 (df = 1443)	0.181 (df = 1388)	0.184 (df = 1443)
F Statistic	8.048*** (df = 7; 1389)	4.513*** (df = 7; 1444)	8.570*** (df = 8; 1388)	4.052*** (df = 8; 1443)	11.252*** (df = 8; 1388)	6.394*** (df = 8; 1443)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

9 Experimental Models with Various Subgroupings

In addition to pooled models and models focused on high- and low-homicide communities, we also examine results across a selection of other subgroups of respondents. In this section, we present additional models regarding internal, external, and relative blame across: high and low victimization communities, high and low security communities, and female and male respondents. Subgroups based on victimization and security are divided using the MRP measures developed for the stratification of our survey. Respondents are divided by the median value for each index.

Table 23: Internal Blame (Divided by Subgroups)

	Dependent variable:					
	High Vic.	Low Vic.	High Insec.	Low Insec.	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class: Middle	0.168**	0.258***	0.205**	0.223***	0.241***	0.177**
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Crime Severity	−0.032	0.083**	−0.047	0.092**	−0.005	0.053
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Victim: Worker	0.214**	−0.092	0.161	−0.009	0.090	0.054
	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.101)
Local Politician	−0.080	−0.011	−0.037	−0.042	0.082	−0.175*
	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.100)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.355***	0.429***	0.443***	0.331***	0.296***	0.492***
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Marginalization Index	5.069***	4.794***	4.986***	4.888***	4.915***	4.966***
	(0.124)	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.128)	(0.129)
Observations	1,426	1,438	1,425	1,439	1,550	1,314
R^2	0.023	0.029	0.027	0.023	0.015	0.036
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.026	0.024	0.019	0.012	0.033
Residual Std. Error	1.503 (df = 1420)	1.588 (df = 1432)	1.563 (df = 1419)	1.528 (df = 1433)	1.593 (df = 1544)	1.488 (df = 1308)
F Statistic	6.770*** (df = 5; 1420)	8.571*** (df = 5; 1432)	7.925*** (df = 5; 1419)	6.634*** (df = 5; 1433)	4.682*** (df = 5; 1544)	9.897*** (df = 5; 1308)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 24: External Blame (Divided by Subgroups)

	Dependent variable:					
	High Vic.	Low Vic.	High Insec.	Low Insec.	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class: Middle	−0.008	−0.077	−0.147*	0.064	−0.049	−0.019
	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.082)
Crime Severity	0.057	−0.020	0.033	0.003	0.044	−0.005
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Victim: Worker	−0.062	−0.018	−0.004	−0.077	−0.063	−0.018
	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.100)
Local Politician	0.147	0.056	0.115	0.085	−0.014	0.238**
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.099)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	−0.282***	−0.234***	−0.242***	−0.269***	−0.347***	−0.144*
	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.082)
Marginalization Index	4.636***	4.841***	4.763***	4.713***	4.822***	4.612***
	(0.122)	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.122)	(0.129)
Observations	1,425	1,435	1,416	1,444	1,543	1,317
R^2	0.014	0.007	0.011	0.010	0.014	0.009
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.004	0.007	0.007	0.011	0.005
Residual Std. Error	1.483 (df = 1419)	1.527 (df = 1429)	1.492 (df = 1410)	1.517 (df = 1438)	1.518 (df = 1537)	1.485 (df = 1311)
F Statistic	3.948*** (df = 5; 1419)	2.124* (df = 5; 1429)	3.114*** (df = 5; 1410)	2.953** (df = 5; 1438)	4.462*** (df = 5; 1537)	2.329** (df = 5; 1311)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 25: Relative Blame (Divided by Subgroups)

	Dependent variable:					
	High Vic.	Low Vic.	High Insec.	Low Insec.	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class: Middle	0.015	0.028***	0.029***	0.014	0.023**	0.017*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Crime Severity	−0.007*	0.009*	−0.006	0.007*	−0.004	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Victim: Worker	0.024**	−0.005	0.015	0.006	0.014	0.007
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Local Politician	−0.018	−0.005	−0.012	−0.010	0.007	−0.032***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Perpetrator: Gang Leader	0.053***	0.054***	0.057***	0.049***	0.054***	0.051***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Marginalization Index	0.534***	0.496***	0.517***	0.514***	0.507***	0.528***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	1,421	1,428	1,414	1,435	1,542	1,307
R^2	0.032	0.030	0.034	0.023	0.025	0.034
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.026	0.031	0.019	0.022	0.030
Residual Std. Error	0.181 (df = 1415)	0.187 (df = 1422)	0.183 (df = 1408)	0.184 (df = 1429)	0.189 (df = 1536)	0.177 (df = 1301)
F Statistic	9.354*** (df = 5; 1415)	8.688*** (df = 5; 1422)	9.956*** (df = 5; 1408)	6.616*** (df = 5; 1429)	7.933*** (df = 5; 1536)	9.039*** (df = 5; 1301)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

10 Focus Groups Guide

This section presents the information regarding focus group participant recruitment and the guide which was used to facilitate the sequential focus groups in this study. The guide is translated from Spanish and only sections relevant to this study are provided below.

10.1 Focus Group Participant Recruitment

Before joining a focus group session, possible participants were invited by the non-governmental organizations we partnered with. The recruits were involved with this NGOs previously via the organizations' service delivery programs. Recruits were offered $ 15.00 USD to participate in a focus group session which lasted two hours on average. They were also offered transportation expenses. This compensation is almost eight times the minimum wage in Mexico ($ 8.06 USD per day), which is what these youths earn in most instances working either in the formal or informal sector.

If participants agreed to join the focus groups, they were informed about the purpose of the research project, were provided with the names and contact of researchers responsible for the project, were informed about the confidentiality of their personal information, the use of shared information, and their right to withdraw from the session or not answer a question whenever they wanted. They were also warned that some of the topics might make them feel upset. They were informed that during their participation, a psychologist was available to speak with them if they wished in such instances. They were then asked if they wanted to participate in the session and were required to provide both verbal and written consent. No forms of deception were included in the focus groups.

10.2 Introduction

1. Introduce the facilitators and the objectives of the project
2. Explanation of how the identity of the participants and all information arising as part of the session will be treated with absolute confidentiality.
    - Participants will be asked to choose a nickname, and only nicknames may be used during the session.
    - Participants will be asked NOT TO MENTION any personal names of people during the session. They may refer to people as "friends," "siblings," etc.
    - Participants will be asked not to discuss the discussion during the session with others who were not part of the session.
3. Explanation of the dyanmics of the session
    - Only one person speaks at a time.
    - If someone has a different opinion than the rest of the group, it is important that they say so.
    - There are no right and wrong answers; all comments are important.

4. Icebreaker dynamic and introductions: participants will share the name they selected with the group, and should share why they chose that name. Each participant will also share their expectations for the session.

5. Read the consent form out loud and ask participants if the session can be audio-recorded.

10.3 Justification of Violence

1. I am going to tell you the story of Rodrigo. He is 17 years old, he is very poor and he left high school to work and help his mother with the expenses. Since he couldn't get a job, a neighbor suggested that he steal other people's belongings (bicycles, bags, cell phones) to resell them. What do you think of the neighbor's proposal?

2. Rodrigo decided to break into the neighbor's business because he and his mother needed money to pay the rent. Of all these people, who do you think would be the worst to rob?

    - A businessman
    - A lower class worker
    - A politician
    - An elderly lower class working woman

3. Rodrigo became very good at robbery, was able to cover his and his mother's expenses, and made a name for himself, so the leader of a criminal gang invites him to join and offers him protection. Will he join?

    - Reasons for "yes"?
    - Reasons for "no"?

4. Rodrigo agreed to join and their first task was to kidnap a businessman After a while, as they were not paid for the kidnapping, the gang leader asked Rodrigo to kill the businessman. Rodrigo did it and the police caught him. From 1-7, how guilty do you think Rodrigo is for this crime?

5. Who are the most responsible for this crime?

    - The businessman
    - The gang leader
    - Rodrigo's mother
    - The police
    - Society
    - The government

6. Would your perception of Rodrigo's guilt in this story change if his family had money? Why?

7. Who is to blame for young people getting involved in crime?

- Youths
- Family
- The government
- Society (ask what they mean by society)
- Criminal organizations

8. What would you propose to prevent more young people from getting involved with crime or joining gangs?

References

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